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May I Pay More? Lessons From Jarrett for Blockchain
Tax Policy
Posted on Sep. 26, 2022
By Amanda Parsons

Colorado Law School.
In this article, Parsons examines Jarrett, a pending refund suit in
which the taxpayers argue that blockchain reward tokens should be
included in income only upon sale or exchange (a position that would
raise their tax bills), and she explores why they sought this treatment
and what implications it holds for policymakers trying to develop a
tax regime for blockchain activities.
AMANDA PARSONS

I. Introduction
In 2021 Joshua and Jessica Jarrett filed suit for a refund of taxes they paid on staking rewards in
2019. In their initial district court complaint,1 they argued that the reward tokens Joshua received
from staking cryptocurrency should not be considered income at the time of receipt; instead, they
should only be considered income upon sale or exchange. Whether their legal argument is valid is
an important question for the future of blockchain taxation.2
In February, the government gave the Jarretts a full refund and moved to dismiss their suit.3 The
Jarretts responded with a motion to amend their original complaint,4 clarifying that they are seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief. Coin Center submitted an amicus brief5 in support of the Jarretts’
position and the government filed a reply.6
But an important and bewildering question is why the taxpayers want to defer tax on the staking
income in the first place. Any law student will tell you that the tax treatment sought in Jarrett is not
desirable. The taxpayers will be giving up the benefit of a preferential long-term capital gains rate on
any appreciation in the value of the block rewards. As professor Omri Marian bluntly explained in his
recent Tax Notes Federal article, “It is just bad tax planning.”7
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Cryptocurrency is considered property for federal income tax purposes.8 If reward tokens are taxed
at the time of receipt, they will be taxed as ordinary income. When a taxpayer later sells the tokens,
any appreciation will be capital income and taxed at a favorable long-term capital gains rate (a
maximum of 23.8 percent).9 If the tokens are not considered income until the taxpayer sells or
exchanges them, the entire appreciation will be taxed at the higher ordinary income rate (a
maximum of 37 percent).10

assuming that the reward tokens were sold on December 31, 2021, for their fair market value, which
was $40,652.11 He first calculated the total tax the Jarretts would pay under the IRS’s position by
including the $9,407 of reward tokens as ordinary income in 2019 and then treating the proceeds
from the sale as long-term capital gains. He then calculated the total tax that the Jarretts would pay
under the tax treatment they advocate for — no income inclusion in 2019 and taxing the full amount
of the sale proceeds as ordinary income in 2021. Marian estimated that the Jarretts’ stance would
cost them an additional $2,867 in taxes.12
So why have the taxpayers taken this position? Or, perhaps more accurately, why are the blockchain
interests that are backing this strategic litigation taking this position?13 This article first considers the
reasons provided in support of this tax treatment in the Jarretts’ brief.14 It then considers two
alternatives: First, that it is the interests of corporate blockchain participants, not individual
taxpayers, that are being represented in this litigation. Second, that blockchain participants plan to
avoid paying taxes when they ultimately sell their block rewards, whether through tax evasion or
perfectly legal tax planning mechanisms. It then highlights the lessons policymakers can draw from
the litigants’ position.

II. The Taxpayers’ Rationales
The Jarretts’ brief sets forth two main rationales for the tax treatment being sought: the
administrative burden of including reward tokens as income at the time of receipt and the dilution in
the reward tokens’ value over time.

A. Administrative Burden
One reason for this “bad tax planning” could be that the administrative burden of reporting staking
income at the time of receipt is so great that the taxpayer is willing to sacrifice any potential
preferential rate treatment to avoid it. The Jarretts, in fact, highlight compliance difficulties as a
practical consideration to support their position.15 Stakers can receive reward tokens as frequently
as every few seconds on some protocols, and the FMV of these reward tokens is extremely volatile.
This can make accurately reporting staking income challenging for taxpayers.16
Reporting staking income as it is received is certainly more challenging than reporting income from
bulk sales of reward tokens. But whether that challenge is so great as to offset the tax advantages of
a preferential capital gains rate is far less certain. The most prominent use case for blockchain
technology is that it provides a secure, immutable, and transparent record of transactions. There is
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In his article, Marian quantified the cost to the Jarretts of forgoing the preferential capital gains rate,

something disingenuous about participants in that technology saying they cannot handle the burden
of reporting blockchain transactions to the IRS. Further, tax software catering specifically to
blockchain investors and participants has proliferated in recent years, lowering taxpayers’
administrative burdens.17

B. Token Value Decline
Another reason that taxpayers might prefer reward tokens not to be included as income until the
suggests this as a possible motivation. The brief discusses how the mechanics of staking in the Tezos
blockchain should result in an overall dilution of the token values over time.18 It would seem most
rational to sell an asset whose value you believe will decline if a market for that asset exists.
Cryptocurrency exchanges provide that market. However, blockchain participants may expect to
receive an overall higher economic return if they retain and stake their new reward tokens in
exchange for additional rewards, even if those tokens are steadily declining in value. In that case, the
tax treatment requested by the taxpayers in Jarrett is rational.

III. Alternative Rationales
But there are other possible reasons to request this tax treatment that are not mentioned in Jarrett’s
brief, and these reasons can be instructive as policymakers develop laws on the taxation of
blockchain. The first is that the interests being represented in this case are not those of individual
blockchain participants but corporate players. The second is that blockchain participants never plan
to pay taxes on their reward tokens. They plan to avoid tax upon the sale of their reward tokens
either through evasion or legitimate tax planning strategies.

A. Jarrett Isn’t About Individuals
The Jarretts did not bring this litigation on their own. Jarrett is a strategic litigation backed by the
Proof of Stake Alliance,19 an advocacy group that brings together “all stakeholders in the proof-ofstake industry,”20 as well as other anonymous backers.21 The interests financially backing this
litigation may not have the same tax considerations as the Jarretts. As a result, while the proposed
treatment may be detrimental to the Jarretts, it may be beneficial to other forces behind the
litigation.
The preferential rate for long-term capital gains income is only available to individuals and other
noncorporate taxpayers.22 Corporate taxpayers pay the same tax rate for capital and ordinary
income. As a result, the tax treatment requested in Jarrett is great tax planning for corporate
taxpayers. It allows them to defer income inclusion without forgoing any tax benefits.
Institutional players have flooded the blockchain space. Bitcoin mining, initially the domain of
programmers and cypherpunks, quickly became centralized and dominated by companies.23 Staking
could soon become dominated by corporate interests as well. A trend has emerged in which major
corporations add cryptocurrency to their balance sheets, with Tesla being perhaps the most visible
example.24 Because block rewards in proof-of-stake networks are typically granted based on the
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time of sale is that they expect the value of their tokens to decline over time. The Jarretts’ brief

relative number of tokens the participant has staked,25 the economics of staking lends itself to a
concentration of tokens in the hands of major holders. And, unlike bitcoin mining, staking does not
require large investments in equipment, electricity, and maintenance costs. It can be delegated to
third parties and serve as a passive income source.26 If corporations could defer paying taxes on
that passive income until the time of sale, it would be a major tax advantage. It is possible that the
goal of the Jarrett litigation is to secure deferral of staking income for corporate interests.

Another possibility is that blockchain participants never plan to pay taxes on their staking income.
They might plan to avoid taxes via evasion. They might plan to take advantage of specific features of
U.S. tax law to avoid paying taxes on their staking income legally, or they might hope to secure
preferential treatment for blockchain activities in future legislation or regulations.
Tax evasion in the context of cryptocurrency has been a major concern starting from the early days
of bitcoin. Concerns about tax evasion make sense considering that cryptocurrency is a technology
that was explicitly developed to allow people to transfer cash to one another directly —
circumventing the oversight of financial institutions.27 The IRS relies on information shared by these
financial institutions to ensure tax compliance.28 Cryptocurrency defies the system, and
commentators have highlighted this evasion potential.29
Requesting tax treatment that would most likely raise the Jarretts’ tax burden and that of other
noncorporate taxpayers30 does not assuage these concerns over tax evasion. Not taxing reward
tokens until their sale or exchange provides a period during which blockchain participants can move
their tokens and scatter them across many different digital wallets.31 This ability to move funds
across wallets, combined with the pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions, would make it
extremely difficult for the IRS to effectively audit blockchain participants and determine whether they
did pay taxes on their reward tokens upon their sale or exchange.
Even a tax-compliant blockchain participant would have avenues to entirely avoid taxation on reward
tokens if they are not included as income upon receipt. The realization requirement has long been a
means to avoid taxation on investment income — a means exploited by the ultrawealthy in
particular. David Gamage and John R. Brooks recently estimated that three-fourths of the investment
gains of those in the top 0.1 percent of U.S. households are never taxed.32 The tax treatment sought
in Jarrett allows blockchain participants to take full advantage of the realization requirement and its
potential for infinite deferral of taxes.
If a blockchain participant were to hold reward tokens until death, their heirs would be able to take
advantage of the section 1014 stepped-up basis and no taxes would ever be paid on the block
rewards.33
For those blockchain participants who want to enjoy the economic gains from their block rewards
during this life, they could employ what professor Edward McCaffery calls the “buy, borrow, die”
method (or, in this case, “stake, borrow, die”).34 Under this method, blockchain participants could use
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B. Participants Never Plan to Pay Taxes

their reward tokens as collateral for loans. They could then use the loan proceeds for current
consumption but continue to hold the tokens until death, allowing heirs to take advantage of
stepped-up basis. The stake, borrow, die method would not necessarily be the exclusive purview of
the ultrawealthy with access to bespoke loan arrangements. Cryptocurrency-backed loans are now
commonly available on major crypto exchanges such as Binance and BlockFi.35
It is also possible that the crypto interests backing Jarrett hope to lobby for favorable new legislation
on the tax treatment of cryptocurrency and blockchain, such as like-kind exchange treatment for
sale or exchange requested in Jarrett could simply be a stalling mechanism until they can achieve
those legislative or regulatory goals.

IV. Lessons From Jarrett
The tax treatment requested in Jarrett is puzzling and should not be accepted at face value.
Analyzing the possible motivations for this desired treatment can provide important insights for
policymakers and regulators as they grapple with creating a regime to regulate and tax this
emerging space.
First, they should recognize that as cryptocurrency and blockchain have become more mainstream,
corporate players have joined the game. When crafting a taxing regime for blockchain activities,
policymakers must consider the appropriate and desired tax treatment of corporations.
Second, preventing blockchain tax evasion should remain a top concern for the IRS. The increase in
IRS enforcement funding in the Inflation Reduction Act (P.L. 117-169), including the specific directive
for increased digital asset monitoring and compliance activities, is an important first step.36
And, finally, Jarrett is yet another reminder of how the realization requirement allows people to
escape taxation on appreciated assets. What is on the surface bad tax planning (forgoing a favorable
long-term capital gains rate) becomes top-notch tax planning when you consider the potential to
permanently escape tax by leveraging the realization requirement.
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